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We show that task juggling, i.e., the spreading of effort across too many active projects, decreases
the performance of workers, raising the chances of low throughput, long duration of projects and exploding
backlogs. Individual speed of job completion cannot be explained only in terms of effort, ability and
experience: work scheduling is a crucial “input” that cannot be omitted from the production function
of individual workers. We provide a simple theoretical model to study the effects of increased task
juggling on the duration of projects. Using a sample of Italian judges we show that those who are induced
for exogenous reasons to work in a more parallel fashion on many trials at the same time, take longer
to complete similar portfolios of cases. The exogenous variation that identifies this causal effect is
constructed exploiting the lottery that assigns cases to judges together with the procedural prescription
requiring judges to hold the first hearing of a case no later than 60 days from filing.
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Consider a worker who is assigned two independent jobs, A and B, each requiring 10 days of
undivided attention to complete. If she juggles both jobs, for example working on A on odd
days and on B on even days, the average duration of the two tasks is equal to 19.5 days. If
instead she focuses on each job in turn, she completes A on the 10-th day and then takes the
next ten days to complete B. In the second case, the average duration of both jobs from the
time of assignment is 15 days. Note that under the second work schedule job B does not take
longer to complete, while A is completed much faster; in other words, avoiding task juggling
results in a Pareto-improvement across task durations. This simple example suggests that,
conditional on eﬀort, ability, and size of assigned workload, workers who juggle too many
tasks at the same time may take longer to complete them.
In this paper we study theoretically and empirically the hypothesis that task juggling
decreases worker performance, raising the chance of low throughput, long duration of tasks
completion and exploding backlogs. Our results suggest that individual speed of job com-
pletion cannot be explained solely in terms of eﬀort, ability and experience. Individual work
scheduling (how much juggling is done) is a crucial input that cannot be omitted from the
production function of individual workers.
Using a sample of Italian judges who receive a randomly assigned workload (Section 2),
we show that the heterogeneity of their performance is considerable and cannot be fully
explained in terms of measures of experience, ability and eﬀort, even if these measures are
very precise and error-free in our data (Section 3). Descriptive evidence suggests that judges
who keep fewer trials active and wait to close the open ones before starting new ones, dispose
more rapidly of a larger number of cases per unit of time. In this way, their backlog remains
low even though they receive the same workload as other judges who juggle more trials at
any given time.
To rationalize this evidence, we propose a theoretical model that explains how task
scheduling (parallel vs. sequential) aﬀects performance in terms of duration, throughput
and backlog (Section 4). The model, which builds on Coviello et al. (2010), also suggests
an explanation of why diﬀerent judges choose to juggle diﬀerent number of cases. This
explanation is based on the idea that parties in a trial lobby the judge to have their case
dealt with sooner. This lobbying behaviour is privately optimal for the lobbying parties, but
socially ineﬃcient because judges cannot resist this multilateral pressure and so they increase
the number of cases they juggle, which slows down the completion of all assigned cases. In this
account, therefore, the heterogeneity in the performance of judges, for given eﬀort and ability,
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trials. Although described for the speciﬁc setting of the judges considered in the empirical
analysis, the suggested mechanism that generates task juggling applies more generally to
environments in which a worker interacts with diﬀerent “customers” or “principals” waiting
for him to complete a set of assigned jobs.
We then use regression analysis on the already mentioned panel of Italian judges, observed
for six years, to show that the choice of work scheduling has quantitatively important eﬀects
on performance, compared to variation in experience, ability and eﬀort (Section 5). In order
to identify the causal eﬀect of parallel tasks scheduling (i.e., task juggling) we construct
time-varying instruments based on the sample realization of the lottery that allocates the
amount and the typology of workload to each judge. This lottery is used in combination
with the procedural rule prescribing that judges should hold the ﬁrst hearing of a case no
later than 60 days from ﬁling. In this way, exogenous increases in the fraction of the assigned
workload that reaches the “60 days” threshold, generate pressure for more parallel working.
Results strongly support the hypothesis that judges induced for exogenous reasons to work
in a more parallel fashion take more time to complete similar portfolios of cases.
These results ﬁt broadly within a recent literature suggesting that, in diﬀerent areas
of human behaviour, individual modes of activity scheduling are related, in some cases
causally, to performance for given eﬀort.1 Thanks to the accurate measurement of the steps
of “production,” and to the access to exogenous quasi-experimental variation, in this paper
we are able to identify fairly tightly the causal eﬀect on performance of a speciﬁc and well
deﬁned individual work practice, i.e., task juggling.
The ﬁnal Section 6 concludes discussing results and their implications.
2 The data
We use data from one Italian court specialized in labor controversies for the industrial area
of Milan. Our initial dataset contains all the 58280 cases ﬁled between January 1, 2000
and December 31, 2005. For 92% of these cases we have information on their entire history,
while the remaining cases are observed up to December 3, 2007. These trials have been
assigned to 31 judges who have been in service for at least one quarter during the period
1See, for example, Ichniowski et al.(1997) for workers in steel plants, Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Bloom
et al. (2007,2009) and Bandiera et al. (2009) for CEO practices, Ameriks et al. (2003) and Lusardi and
Mitchell (2008) for family ﬁnancial planning and, closer to us, Aral et al. (2007) for multitasking activities
and the productivity of single workers, and Garicano and Heaton (2010) for organization and productivity
in the public sector. See also the recent surveys of Gibbons and Robert (2010) and Della Vigna (2009), the
latter speciﬁcally on the issue of self-control in individual behaviour.
3of observation. For the judges who were already in service on January 1, 2000, we also
have information on the cases that were assigned to them in the previous year and we can
therefore compute a measure of their backlog at the beginning of the period under study. For
the judges who took service during the period of observation (or less than one year before
January 1, 2000) we analyze their performance starting from the ﬁfth of their quarters of
service, in order to give them time to settle in. All the cases assigned to them during the
ﬁrst year of service (including those that were transferred to them from previous judges who
left for another oﬃce or retired) are nevertheless counted to compute their backlog at the
beginning of the second year of service in which we start to analyze their performance. Thus
all the judges that we analyze have at least one year of tenure, and for each we know the
backlog of not-yet-disposed cases at the beginning of the period of observation.
We consider quarters as the relevant time unit and we focus on the subset of judges who
received full workloads of new controversies within each quarter. We therefore eliminated
the quarter observations concerning judges who did not receive a full workload because they
retired, were transferred, were contemporaneously assigned to other duties or were in long
term absence periods during which they were not receiving cases.
In Italy, as in other countries, the law (Art. 25 of the Constitution) requires that judges
receive a randomly assigned portfolio of new cases. This random assignment is designed to
ensure the absence of any relationship between the identity of judges and the characteristics
of the cases assigned to them. In the court that we consider this prescription is implemented
in the following way. Every morning the judges in service are ordered alphabetically starting
from a randomly extracted letter of the alphabet; the cases ﬁled during the day are assigned
in sequence to all judges in service. As a result, given the large number of new cases ﬁled
per quarter, the portfolios of controversies is qualitatively similar for all the judges that
we observe within each quarter. Remaining diﬀerences across judges are due to random
variability of assignments and are independent of the identity of judges. For example, if in
a given day the letter extracted is B and 5 cases are ﬁled, only judges with a name starting
from B to F will receive an assignment on that day.
At the end of this selection process we are left with the subset of judges described in Tables
1 and 2. Of the original 31 judges, 21 have a quantitatively and qualitatively comparable
workload (up to random diﬀerences) within each quarter and are therefore retained for the
analysis. Table 1 shows, for example, that during the ﬁrst quarter of 2000, the 18 judges in
service received 129 cases on average with a standard deviation of 13 cases. The standard
deviation is similarly small in the other quarters. Table 2 reports the number of quarters in
which each judge is observed over each year and in total. The panel is unbalanced, with 6
4judges observed for all the 24 quarters, while the others are observed for fewer quarters with
a minimum of 8 quarters. The last column of Table 2 reports the number of cases assigned
to each judge per quarter on average.
For the purpose of this study it is important to realize that the workload of a judge
may change across quarters because of the temporal variation in the number of ﬁled cases
or in the number of judges in service, and therefore for reasons that are independent of the
identity of judges. Moreover, within each quarter, the qualitative and quantitative workload
may diﬀer across judges because of the variability randomly generated by the assignment
procedure described above and thus once again independently of the identity of judges.
As we will see, for the purpose of identiﬁcation these are attractive and convenient
features of our data that compensate for the unfortunate fact that we have no information
of any kind concerning the judges under study, not even age and gender. Diﬀerently from
other datasets, which typically have some demographic characteristics but do not contain
measures of ability and eﬀort, we instead observe the entire history of all the cases assigned
to each judge. With this information we can construct, as we will see in the next section,
very precise time-varying measures of performance, work scheduling, ability, and eﬀort for
each judge.
3 Descriptive evidence
In this Section, we compare judges on the basis of average indicators of performance per
quarter, computed over all the quarters in which each judge is observed.
3.1 Total duration and active cases
The height of circles (marked by the judge id number) on the vertical axis of the top left
panel of Figure 1 measures the total duration of cases assigned to each judge. Total duration
is deﬁned as the number of days from the ﬁling date until the date in which a sentence is
deposited by the judge, or the case is settled, or censoring occurs in the few cases for which
we do not see the end of the trial.2 On the horizontal axis judges are ordered from the
slowest one to the left (Judge 30) to the fastest one to the right (Judge 3). The height of
the squares in the same panel indicates the workload of new cases assigned to each judge
on average per quarter. This graphic representation makes transparent the heterogeneity of
performance, in terms of duration of trials, observed for these judges despite the fact that
they receive a workload which is fairly similar in quantity (because we selected only judges
2See Section 2.
5who receive a full workload) and quality (because of random assignment). For example, at
the opposite extremes, Judges 30 and 3 receive respectively 120 and 105 cases per quarter,
but the ﬁrst one needs 398 days to close them while the second one need only 178 days, i.e.,
less than half.
The bottom left panel in the same ﬁgure plots the number cases on which each judge is
contemporaneously working on average in a quarter. We call these “active” cases. Formally,
a case is deﬁned as active at a given date if its ﬁrst hearing has already taken place but the
case has not been completed yet. Of course we do not know the exact moment in which a
judge starts working on cases previously assigned to her, but it seems reasonable to consider
the ﬁrst hearing as a good approximation of this moment. Also in this panel (as in all the
others of this ﬁgure) judges are ordered from the slowest one on the left to the fastest one
on the right. The vertical comparison between the left panels of the ﬁgure highlights the
striking correlation across judges (0.93) between the average number of active cases and
the average duration of trials. Comparing again extreme cases, the slowest Judge 30 keeps
on average 275 ﬁles contemporaneously open on his desk while Judge 3 works on only 116
cases at the same time. In general, those who “keep more pots on the ﬁre need more time
to complete meals”. It is important to keep in mind that these diﬀerences emerge among
judges of the same oﬃce, who work in exactly the same conditions, with the same secretarial
assistance and with a very similar workload in terms of quantity and quality.
3.2 Throughput and backlog
If keeping too many ﬁles opened at the same time slows down the activity of a judge, also
the number of cases he will be able to close per quarter will be negatively aﬀected. The top
central panel of Figure 1 conﬁrms this intuition by plotting the throughput of judges ordered,
as usual, from left to right according to speed of case completion. The slowest Judge 30 has
almost the worst throughput (106 cases per quarter, just 8 more than the worst performer,
Judge 29). The best performer in terms of throughput is Judge 11 (131 cases per quarter)
who is the second best performer in terms of duration. The correlation between the number
of active cases and the number of closed cases across judges per quarter is -0.36 and suggests
that judges who work on few cases at the same time, opening new ones only when older
ones are closed, can not only dispose of assigned cases in less time from assignment but also
increase their throughput per quarter.
Consistently with this hypothesis, it is not surprising to infer, from the bottom central
panel of Figure 1, that the fastest judges with fewer active cases have on average a lower
backlog at the beginning of each quarter. This backlog ranges from the 545 cases of Judge
618, who keeps 258 cases open at the same time and is one of the worse performers in terms
of duration and throughput, to the 230 cases of the already mentioned top performer Judge
3, who has on average only 116 ﬁles on his desk at the same time. Even if all these judges
receive the same number of cases per quarter their backlog is highly correlated with the
number of active cases (0.94).
Our analysis suggests that the capacity of a judge to work on only few cases at the same
time, independently of how many have been assigned to her, is likely to improve signiﬁcantly
her capacity to dispose quickly of a large number of cases and to avoid an uncontrolled
explosion of the backlog. In other words, sequential working, as opposed to parallel working,
helps to avoid a situation of congestion.
3.3 Complication of cases, ability and eﬀort of judges
Although suggestive, our hypothesis concerning the role of parallel working on the perfor-
mance of judges must be confronted with other more obvious potentially relevant determi-
nants of this performance. In this section we focus on proxies of ability and eﬀort.
Consider the average number of hearings that a judge needs to close a case. Without
random assignment this statistic would depend on both the diﬃculty of the cases assigned
to a judge and on her ability to handle them quickly. But given random assignment, the
complication of controversies that judges face should be fairly similar, up to small random
diﬀerences determined by the realization of the assignment procedure described in Section 2.
Therefore, diﬀerences across judges in the average number of hearings to close a case should
mostly capture the unobservable skills that determine how a judge can control the trial and
the behaviour of parties, lawyers and witnesses, in order to reach quickly a decision.
This statistic is plotted in the top right panel of Figure 1, where judges are again ordered,
on the horizontal axis, from the slowest one on the left to the fastest one on the right. In
contrast with the previously examined panels of this ﬁgure, here we do not see a clear pattern
jumping out of the data. Some slow judges on the left (like 30 and 18) require less than
3 hearings to close a case on average, while many faster judges need more (including in
particular the top performers 3 and 14). The correlation between duration and number of
hearings per case is positive (0.18) but relatively low. Inasmuch as being able to decide a
case with fewer hearings is a form of ability of a judge, this descriptive evidence does not
suggest that such characteristics has a strong eﬀect on performance as measured by total
duration of cases.
A measure of eﬀort is instead oﬀered in our data by the number of hearings per unit
of time. The idea is that, by exerting more eﬀort, a judge can schedule more hearings per
7quarter and in this way can ceteris paribus improve her performance in terms of throughput
and total duration of completed cases. This statistic is plotted in the bottom right panel of
Figure 1 and also in this case we cannot infer an evident pattern connecting this measure
of eﬀort to performance in terms of duration and throughput. Interestingly, the slowest two
Judges 30 and 21 schedule the same number of hearings per quarter than the fastest two
judges 3 and 11. If anything, it seems that the capacity to “keep fewer pots on the ﬁre”
allows the faster judges to economize on eﬀort, but all in all the correlation between this
measure of eﬀort and duration is practically null (-0.06)
In other words, despite the fact that the performance of judges, in terms of duration and
throughput, is very heterogeneous, no clear strong link emerges between this performance
and good proxies of ability and eﬀort like the number of hearings needed to handle cases of
similar complication and the number of hearings per unit of time.
To summarize, the descriptive evidence presented in this section suggests that parallel
working, as opposed to sequentialworking may reduce considerably the performance of judges
in terms of throughput and total duration of the cases assigned to them. The judges who
work on few cases at the same time and try to close them quickly before opening new ones,
succeed in closing a larger number of cases per quarter and in less time from the assignment.
In this way they can keep low the backlog at the beginning of each quarter, even if they receive
the same number of cases per quarter as their slower court-mates. These latter, who tend
to work in parallel on many cases, appear to be overwhelmed and their performance suﬀers.
Indicators of experience, ability and eﬀort are as well likely to be relevant determinants of
performance, but in a possibly less signiﬁcant way. However, to properly assess the relative
importance of these factors a theoretical framework and a multivariate statistical analysis
are needed, to which we turn in the next Sections 4 and 5.
Before doing so, it seems important to say a word on the possibility of a “quantity versus
quality” trade oﬀ in the performance of judges. Could it be that the judges with the highest
throughput and the lowest total duration are worse judges in terms of quality of decisions?
The evidence presented in Figure 2 suggests that the answer is no, as long as the percent of
appealed cases can be considered as a good measure of the quality of the judges’ decisions.
There is no evidence that the cases assigned to slow judges on the left have a lower probability
of appeal than the cases assigned to fast judges on the right. If anything the opposite seems
to hold, given that the correlation between total duration and the percent of appealed cases
is positive (0.41). The judges who perform better in terms of throughput and duration of
cases seem to be also the ones who take decisions of better quality.
84 Theory
4.1 Setup and Deﬁnitions
Time is indexed by quarters q, starting with q =1 , the ﬁrst quarter in which the judge
operates, and possibly going to inﬁnity.
A judge confronts C cases, where a case is indexed by c. We allow C to be inﬁnite. Each
case is made up of S distinct steps, or tasks, each of which takes 1 unit of time to accomplish.
The s-th step of case c is denoted by cs. Case c is said to be completed when its last step cS
has been accomplished.
Cases begin by being assigned to a judge. Cases may not all be assigned at once; rather,
they may be assigned progressively over time. As a matter of convention, we stipulate that
cases with lower c arrive earlier. We denote with αq the number of cases assigned in quarter q.
Each case is worked on progressively through several quarters, and in each quarter the judge
works on several cases. The number of tasks (steps of possibly diﬀerent cases) accomplished
in quarter q is denoted by eq. We interpret eq as capturing the judge’s eﬀort in quarter q.
All cases assigned in quarter q are assumed to take Sq tasks to dispose. In our empirical
analysis, Sq is measured as the average number of hearings it takes to adjudicate a case.
Clearly, as we said in Section 3.3, this measure reﬂects the inherent complexity of the cases
assigned to the judge. Moreover, to the extent that Sq varies systematically across judges
even though workloads are of similar complexity, Sq also reﬂects some kind of individual
ability of the judge, the ability to adjudicate cases with fewer hearings. In general we will
interpret Sq as a measure of both complexity of cases and individual ability of the judge.
When comparing identical portfolios of cases assigned to diﬀerent judges, instead, it will
measure their ability.
The duration of case c is the number of quarters that elapse between the time the case is
assigned and the time it is completed. We denote the duration of a case assigned in quarter
q as Dq.3
We now discuss the ways in which the judge allocates his eﬀort across cases and through
time. To this end we introduce the notion of work schedule. A work schedule simply captures
the order in which the judge accomplishes tasks related to diﬀerent cases. We will deﬁne
two polar opposite work schedules, the sequential and the full rotation schedules. We then
deﬁne a third, more general type of work schedule, which we call rotation on the open.A s
3Even within our stylized models it is possible that the cases assigned at the beginning of quarter q may
be disposed earlier than those assigned at the end of quarter q. In this case one might want to consider more
complicated measures of duration, such as the average duration of cases assigned in a quarter. To sidestep
this inconvenience, we deﬁne Dq as the duration of the ﬁrst case assigned in a quarter.
9we will show, both the sequential and the full rotation schedule are special cases of rotation
on the open.
For ease of exposition in this subsection we assume that all the cases have been assigned
in the ﬁrst quarter.
Deﬁnition 1. A work schedule is a complete strict order ≺ on the set of all tasks such
that
a) cs ≺ cs0 if s<s 0.
b) c1 ≺ c0
1 if c<c 0.
The ﬁrst condition says that the steps of case c have to be performed sequentially,
from ﬁrst to last. This requirement does not mean that the steps have to be performed
consecutively—the judge can alternate between steps of diﬀerent cases. The second condi-
tion says that a case with a higher index cannot be started before any case with a lower
index.
We now deﬁne three diﬀerent work schedules.
Deﬁnition 2. The sequential work schedule is the work schedule in which the ordering
cs ≺ c0
s0 ≺ cs+1 does not arise for any cs,c 0
s0.
The full rotation work schedule is one in which, between every two steps of a given
case, there is at least one task of every other case. Formally, given cs,c s+1, for any c0 6= c
there is some s0 such that cs ≺ c0
s0 ≺ cs+1.
A rotation on the open is a work schedule in which if c0
1 ≺ cs ≺ c0
S then there is some
s0 such that cs ≺ c0
s0 ≺ cs+1.
The sequential work schedule is that in which cases are worked on sequentially: ﬁrst all
the steps relating to the ﬁrst case are accomplished, then all the steps relating to the second
case, etc. The polar opposite of a sequential work schedule is the full rotation one, in which,
within each step, cases are worked on according to their arrival order. In Lemma 1 (see the
Appendix 7.1) we show that, in a full rotation, cs must immediately be followed by (c +1 ) s
and Cs must immediately be followed by 1s+1. A rotation on the open is a process that
works just as a full rotation does, except that instead of rotating on all cases, the rotation
on the open does not touch cases that have not been started yet. The condition c0
1 ≺ cs ≺ c0
S
identiﬁes those cases c0 that were open at the time step cs was accomplished.
Example 1. Let there be three cases each requiring two steps, so that C =3and S =2 .
The sequential work schedule is
11 ≺ 12 ≺ 21 ≺ 22 ≺ 31 ≺ 32.
10The full rotation work schedule is
11 ≺ 21 ≺ 31 ≺ 12 ≺ 22 ≺ 32.
Now let there be three cases each requiring three steps, so that C =3and S =3 .The following
schedule is a rotation on the open.
11 ≺ 21 ≺ 12 ≺ 22 ≺ 13 ≺ 31 ≺ 23 ≺ 32 ≺ 33.
In the ﬁrst ﬁve positions of the schedule only cases 1 and 2 are open, and so the deﬁnition
of rotation requires the schedule to alternate between the steps of cases 1 and 2. In the
sixth position case 3 gets opened. The deﬁnition then requires that 23 follow, because the
alternative (32) would violate the deﬁnition (set c =3 ,c 0 =2 .) The fact that 32 and 33 are
adjacent in the order does not violate the deﬁnition because only case 3 is open by the time
the order gets to the last two tasks.
Let us contrast the full rotation and sequentialwork schedule. In the full rotation schedule
cases are started as early as possible, and they are completed late in the order of the work
schedule. Consequently, at any given point in time there is a large mass of cases being
simultaneously worked on. In contrast, a sequential work schedule causes the start of a
new case to be postponed as late as possible, and the completion of cases happens evenly
throughout the unfolding of the work schedule. As a result, in a sequential work schedule
the minimum possible number of cases is simultaneously being worked on at any point in
time. In this sense, we can say that a full rotation is the polar opposite of a sequential work
schedule.
The rotation on the open is a general family of work schedules which subsumes as special
cases the full rotation and the sequential. This family is parameterized by the position in
the work schedule in which cases are opened. That is to say, a rotation on the open can take
diﬀerent forms depending on how early in the work schedule the cases are opened. If, for
example, all cases are opened as early as possible, and thus the ﬁrst C steps in the ordering
are 11,21,...,C1, then a rotation on the open becomes identical to a full rotation. If, instead,
new cases are opened at the slowest possible pace, that is, one every S steps, then there is
only one case open at the any one time and so the rotation on the open becomes a sequential
work schedule.
4.2 Eﬀect of Parallel Work on Durations
In this section we show that a judge who works more “in parallel” takes more time to
complete all his cases. To simplify the exposition we will maintain the assumption that all
11cases have been assigned in the ﬁrst quarter. Our model then implies that all cases take
S1 = S to complete. At the end of the section we will discuss what happens if cases are
heterogeneous in the number of steps they take to complete.
Deﬁnition 3. The rank ρ(cs) of task cs is given by 1 plus the number of tasks which
precede cs in the ordering of the work schedule. The opening rank of case c is ρ(c1). The
completion rank of case c is ρ(cS).
Although the previous deﬁnition does not explicitly involve quarters, one may still asso-
ciate ρ(cs) with the time period in which task cs is performed. If ρ(cs) is small then we think
of that task as being performed earlier. Thus, for example, we say that case c is completed
earlier if ρ(cS) becomes smaller.
A main focus of our analysis is the early completion of cases. We want to show that,
within the family of rotations on the open, anticipating the opening of cases tends to delay
the completion of all cases. To this end, we need to be precise about what it means to
anticipate the opening of cases.
Deﬁnition 4. Take two rotations on the open denoted by ≺ and e ≺ with opening ranks
given by ρ(c1) and e ρ(c1), respectively. We say that e ≺ anticipates the opening of case
b c relative to ≺ if: (a) the work schedules ≺ and e ≺ coincide at ranks lower than e ρ(b c1); and
(b) e ρ((b c + k)1) − e ρ(b c1)=ρ((b c + k)1) − ρ(b c1).
This deﬁnition says that anticipating the opening of case b c means the following. Starting
from a rotation on the open ρ, one decreases the opening ranks of all cases b c and higher
by the same amount. In order to end up with a rotation on the open, this will require
rearranging the ordering of tasks above e ρ(b c1). Otherwise, the ordering of tasks below e ρ(b c1)
is left unchanged. Let’s work through an example.
Example 2. Consider the following two rotations on the open.
11 ≺ 21 ≺ 12 ≺ 22 ≺ 13 ≺ 23 ≺ 31 ≺ 41 ≺ 32 ≺ 42 ≺ 51 ≺ 33 ≺ 43 ≺ 52 ≺ 53
11 ≺ 21 ≺ 31 ≺ 41 ≺ 12 ≺ 22 ≺ 51 ≺ 32 ≺ 42 ≺ 13 ≺ 23 ≺ 52 ≺ 33 ≺ 43 ≺ 53
In the second schedule the openings of case 3 and all following cases are anticipated by
4 periods, relative to the ﬁrst schedule. Now let’s look at the date of completion. Cases 1
through 4 are completed later in the second schedule than in the ﬁrst, while case 5 is completed
at the same time in the two schedules.
12This example shows what it means to anticipate cases 3 and following. In the example
the opening of case 3 is moved up to the place in the order where cases 1 and 2 get opened.
The eﬀect of this perturbation is to increase the “frequency” with which cases are opened
early on in the order, and otherwise leave unchanged the “frequency” with which cases are
opened (except for the end of the order, where fewer cases are opened because there are
no more cases to open). The example also shows that the eﬀect of such anticipation is to
increase the completion rank of all cases.
We now introduce the main theoretical result of the paper, showing that the judge who
opens many cases early completes them all late.
Proposition 1. Suppose C is ﬁnite. Suppose that, within the family of rotations on the
open, we take a speciﬁc schedule and change it by anticipating the opening date of case b c and
all following cases. Then every case is completed no earlier, and some are completed strictly
later.
Proof. See the Appendix 7.1.
This proposition is the main theoretical insight in this paper. It says that anticipating
the opening of a case imposes a negative externality on all other cases if the judge follows
a rotation on the open. The intuition is simple. By opening a new case, the judge pulls
resources away from cases which are closer to being completed i.e., all other cases given the
First In First Out (FIFO) nature of a rotation on the open. Moreover, the newly opened
case does not beneﬁt from being opened earlier, in the sense that it will still have to wait
that all other cases are completed before it too can be completed (again, this follows from
the FIFO nature of the rotation on the open). Therefore, opening too many cases too early
is Pareto-inferior.
This proposition also implies that all cases last longer in a full rotation schedule than in
a sequential schedule. Indeed, a full rotation schedule is obtained starting from a sequential
schedule and progressively anticipating the opening of all cases 2,...,C. More generally, the
proposition implies that an eﬃcient judge is one who opens cases at a slow rate and keeps
few cases active at any given time.
We now extend the logic of this proposition to the situation in which cases are heteroge-
neous in their length Sc. Rather than developing a full-blown theoretical model of heteroge-
neous cases, we limit ourselves to showing that the main result of this section, namely, that
a speciﬁc sequential schedule is faster than a full rotation, is maintained. To be precise, how-
ever, we now need to realize that there are many sequential schedules, each characterized by
the prioritization of cases with diﬀerent Sc. The duration-minimizing schedule is the one in
13which cases are worked on one at a time (sequential), and the priority is such that if Sc <S c0
then case c must be started (and completed) before case c0 is touched. All other schedules,
including the full rotation one, give a larger total duration. The logic is most easily seen via
an example. Suppose we have two cases c and c0, both assigned at time zero. Let Sc =5
and Sc0 =1 0 , so case c takes fewer steps to complete. If we schedule the cases sequentially
starting from c (the shortest one), the sum of total durations is 5 + 15 = 20. If we do them
in parallel (full rotation starting with step c1) the sum of total durations is 9 + 15 = 24.
This example shows that a sequential schedule which prioritizes short cases is faster than
a parallel schedule. It is easy to convince oneself that this principle holds in general, no
matter what the number of cases and their individual complexity S are. Moreover, the same
principle applies if cases are not all assigned at zero, but rather some are assigned while the
judge is in mid-process. In this case the duration-minimizing strategy is the following. At
each point in time the judge should evaluate the number of steps left to completion for each
case in front of her, and work only on the case with the fewer steps to completion. This is
again a sequential work schedule, but one that allows for newly assigned cases to “cut in
line” and be worked on if they have the fewest number of steps to completion. If a case
“cuts in line” then the case previously being worked on should be kept on hold until it again
becomes the case with the fewer number of steps to completion.
Bottom line: also in the presence of heterogeneity and diﬀerent assignment dates, if the
goal is just to minimize the duration of cases the optimal work schedule is a sequential
schedule with only one open case at any moment. The single open case on which the judge
should work would have to be the one closer to completion within the existing backlog. If
other objectives suggest diﬀerent orderings of the sequence of cases or a rotation of eﬀort on
more than one case at the same time, then pursuing these objectives comes at the cost of
increasing average duration.
4.3 Towards a Theoretical Framework for the Empirical Analysis
of Congestion
In this section we want to obtain an expression for the duration of a case, as a function
of several inputs: the eﬀort, the complexity of cases, the arrival rate of new cases and the
degree of parallelism, or equivalently the number of active cases at any point in time, which
measures the congestion the judge operates under.
The eﬀect of the ﬁrst two variables, eﬀort and complexity, can be appreciated even in the
most stark model in which there is only one case, C =1 . This case is particularly simple
because there is no question of how eﬀort is distributed among diﬀerent cases. The only
14factors that determine duration, then, are the number of hearings that it takes to adjudicate
the case (which we denote by S) and the number of hearings the judge makes per quarter
(which we denote by eq). Under the assumption that the judge exerts the same eﬀort in






A similar expression can be derived when eq is not constant across quarters.
When we have more than one case, a third factor beyond e and S aﬀects the duration of
cases, namely, how many cases the judge keeps open at any point in time, which is a measure
of congestion. The easiest way to generalize equation (1) so as to account for the eﬀect of
congestion is to study a system that evolves through time, but that does so in a very stable
way. To this end we now introduce the simplest possible evolution of the system over time.
Deﬁnition 5. A judge operates according to a stable rotation if:
(a) in each quarter the judge keeps A0 open cases;
(b) the number α of cases assigned, their complexity of cases S, the eﬀort e, and the
number of new cases opened, are all constant in each quarter;
(c) the work schedule is a rotation on the open;
(d) the number of cases completed is constant across quarters, and is the same as the
number of new cases opened.
Figure 3 describes a snapshot of a judge’s caseload in a stable rotation. Each folder
represents a case and the horizontal axis is the number of hearings (steps) of that case that
have already been completed. In this example, each case requires S = 5 hearings to complete.
At the time of the snapshot, this judge has 5 open cases that have had one hearing, 5 open
cases that have had two, and so on. Cases which are closer to completion are colored in a
lighter shade. To the left of the vertical axis are cases which have not yet been started. The
white folders represent cases that are done, i.e., have received 5 hearings.
Starting from this snapshot, if we let time run forward we will see that the judge holds
one hearing for every open case; this is because the judge follows a rotation on the open.
Graphically, this eﬀort moves all folders one step to the right. In addition, the judge opens
the ﬁve cases to the left of the vertical axis. Let us imagine that this is all the eﬀort the
judge has time for in a quarter (this implies e = 25). In this case A0 =2 0 , and the input rate
is exactly equal to the throughput rate, as it must be in a stable rotation. The throughput
4Actually, to be precise the duration would be the smallest integer that exceeds S/e, but from now on
we will ignore such integer problems.
15in a quarter is exactly 5 cases, which is equal to e/S. This equality is no coincidence: in
Appendix 7.2 we prove that the input rate and the output rate must be exactly equal to e/S
for there to be a stable rotation.
Note that in a stable rotation the duration of cases Dq need not be constant over time.
Indeed, in a stable rotation the backlog of cases will grow if the arrival rate of cases exceeds
the rate at which they are opened. In Appendix 7.2 we fully analyze how a stable rotation




(A0 + αq) − q. (2)
This expression solves for the duration Dq of cases assigned in quarter q in terms of the
known quantities: the exogenous assignment rate α, the measure of eﬀort e/S,and the initial
condition A0, which is a parameter that can be speciﬁed arbitrarily. If a judge starts out
with A0 active cases in q = 0, and new cases are opened at the rate of e/S in quarters
q =1 ,2,..., then cases will be solved at a rate of e/S per quarter and at all times there will
be A0 active cases. While the output rate of cases does not depend on A0, the duration of
each individual case does according to expression (2).
Using this expression we can illustrate some of the determinants of duration, albeit at
a stable rotation. The duration of a case is increasing in α, the rate at which cases are
assigned to the judge. It is decreasing in e/S, which means that judges who work hard (high
e) or who have easy cases and/or are more able (low S) will have a lower duration of cases
in steady state. Having a large number of active cases A0 increases duration. Finally, the
duration of cases increases with the judge’s tenure (
∂Dq
∂q > 0) if and only if α > e/S, that is,
if the arrival rate exceeds the judge’s eﬀort scaled by the perceived complexity of cases. We
record these ﬁndings in a proposition.
Proposition 2. In a stable rotation, the duration of a case assigned at q is increasing in α,
in S/e, in A0 and, if α>e / S , also in q.
Proposition (2) provides a theory-based starting point for implementing an econometric
analysis of the contributing factors to durations. However, Proposition (2) is limited in an
important way: it describes a kind of “stable state” in which cases are opened and closed at
the same rate. But are the judges considered in this study eﬀectively working under such
a stable rotation? We address this question in the next Section 4.4, where we show that
although they are close to a stable rotation, their opening rate of cases is not constant over
time and is often larger than their closing rate. Thus a stable rotation is limited in its ability
to account for what we see in the data and more generally to explain what is the eﬀect of
16an increase in congestion. Indeed, in a stable rotation the amount of congestion is constant
because, by deﬁnition, cases are opened at the same rate at which they are completed. We
will therefore generalize our framework in Section 4.5, to the more interesting and realistic
case in which congestion can change.
4.4 Are judges scheduling tasks according to a stable rotation?
To establish whether judges eﬀectively work according to a stable rotation we have estimated







where standard error are reported in parentheses under the coeﬃcients. According to these
estimates these judges work on a schedule that is very close to a stable rotation but does not
coincide exactly with it. The slope is approximately equal to 1 indicating that judges open
one new case for each case that they close. But the positive intercept (even if statistically
not signiﬁcant) suggests that on average they also open approximately 6 new cases in every
quarter on top of those that they close. As a result the number of active cases on their desk
steadily increases over quarters albeit at a relatively low pace.
This pattern can be appreciated graphically in Figure 4. The top left panel plots the
number of cases opened and closed per quarter by the seven best judges in terms of average
duration. The two lines are very close one to the other, which is what should happen if these
judges work according to a stable rotation, but the numbers of opened and closed cases,
albeit similar, are clearly not constant overtime. The top right panel repeat the exercise
for the seven worst judges. For these judges it happens more frequently that the number of
new opened cases is larger than the number of closed cases. It is therefore not surprising to
ﬁnd, in the bottom left panel, that the seven worst judges have more active cases in each
quarter. This panel also shows that for both type of judges (and in particular for the worst)
the number of active cases increases over time with jumps that obviously correspond closely
to the quarters in which more cases are opened than closed. Finally the last panel shows
that the duration of all assigned cases diﬀers across the two groups of judges and evolves
over time within each group, in line with the number of active cases, as predicted by our
model.
This evidence suggests that some judges are closer than others to a stable rotation sched-
ule. But deviations from a stable rotation exist (in both directions) and have important
5The regression has been estimated on 381 quarter-judge observations and include ﬁxed eﬀects for the 21
judges.
17eﬀects on the number of active cases and on the duration of assigned cases. We therefore
have to incorporate in our theory of the production function of judges also the eﬀects of
deviations from a stable rotation and more generally of changes in the number of opened
cases. The next section is devoted to this task.
4.5 What happens outside of a stable rotation
To capture the notion of an increase in congestion we need to think of a (temporary) increase
in the number of cases newly opened in quarter q, like, for example, the one described in
Figure 5. If we denote this number by νq, then in a stable rotation we have ν1 = ν2 = ... = ν.
Suppose now we increase ν for a speciﬁc quarter, say we double ν in quarter 3. In other
words we start from the steady-state pattern ν,ν,ν,... and we want to check the eﬀect on
durations of going to the pattern ν,ν,2ν,ν,.... What is the eﬀect of increasing congestion?
By Proposition 1, the eﬀect will be to increase durations.6 Therefore, we have the following
proposition, which is really a corollary of Proposition 1.
Proposition 3. Starting from any work schedule (including a stable rotation), increasing





q, increases the total duration of cases assigned at q.
What mechanism can generate variation in νq? More generally, what do we think de-
termines the judge’s choice of how many new cases to open? The question is particularly
relevant if we conclude, as we will, that the judges’ output rate suﬀers because of an excessive
number of new cases opened in each quarter. In a related paper (Coviello et al. 2010), we
propose and analyze theoretically a possible mechanisms. The idea is that judges open too
many cases because they are under pressure by the parties to do so.7 In a nutshell, the model
is the following. Every day, a judge holds S hearings. The parties of every case assigned
to the judge would like their case to have as many hearings as possible on that day. The
parties can pay a lobbying cost and pressure the judge to hold as many hearings as possible
on their case in that day. Judges are unable to fully resist this pressure and so anyone who
wants to bear the cost of lobbying the judge can ensure that, on any given day, the judge
6Of course, given the restriction to ﬁnite C, it becomes necessary for us to have zero cases opened in the
last quarter, which would not necessarily be the case in a dynamic model where cases are inﬁnite. But this
is not really a limitation, since we prove that the pattern ν,ν,2ν,ν,0 produces longer durations than the
pattern ν,ν,ν,ν,ν. A fortiori, the pattern ν,ν,2ν,ν,ν (which we do not study) would produce even longer
durations, and thus strengthen our conclusions.
7 This is certainly not the only possible mechanism. Alternatives could depend on peer eﬀects (see,
for example, Kandel and Lazear (1992), Falk and Ichino (2006) and Mas and Moretti (2009)) or on self
control problems (see, for example, Laibson (1997), Della Vigna and Malmendier (2004), Della Vigna and
Malmendier (2006)). Exploring the implications of these alternatives is left for future research.
18devotes an equal proportion of his time to their case. The pressure from multiple parties
forces the judge to split his eﬀort across several lobbied cases, which may lead to holding one
hearing on each of S diﬀerent cases. In other words, the judge is endogenously “forced into”
a work schedule that resembles a rotation on the open.8 Moreover, because the parties with
cases assigned but not yet opened can lobby as well, this mechanism results in an excessive
amount of cases opened in each quarter. The degree to which judges are subject to this
ineﬃciency depends, among other things, on the judge’s power to resist the pressures at any
particular time. Formally, this power can be modeled by allowing the lobbying costs to vary
across judges and across quarters. Such a variation is a plausible source of variation in νq
across judges and quarters.
We now have all the elements to specify a theory-based econometric model of the duration
of cases, with the goal of estimating the causal eﬀect of an increase in the degree of parallelism
of a judge. This is done in the next section.
5 Econometric evidence on the eﬀect of parallel work-
ing on trials’ duration
5.1 Speciﬁcation
According to standard theories of the individual production function, that ignore the schedul-
ing of tasks, the duration of trials would depend only on the size of the workload, the diﬃculty
of cases, the eﬀort and the ability of a judge. The theory presented in Section 4 suggests,
instead, that measures of the extent to which a judge work in parallel must be included
in the speciﬁcation. The simplest way to introduce such measures is oﬀered by equation 2,
which is derived under the assumption that the judge works according to a “stable rotation”.
A linear approximation of equation 2 is





+ γ4q + γ5Ai,0 + ui,q (4)






i,q is eﬀort standardized by the complexity of cases as perceived by
the judge (which is also, potentially, a measure of ability), q is a time trend, Ai,0 is the initial
judge-speciﬁc condition that deﬁnes the stable number of cases on which the judge rotates
tasks. The presence of the error term ui,q is justiﬁed because in the data the workload, eﬀort
8Note that, if the judge was not pressurized, he might well be able to focus all S daily hearing on one
case, i.e., operate on a sequential work schedule, thus maximizing his output.
19and complexity are not constant over time, while, if they were constant, equation 2 would
be an exact relationship, as explained in Section 4.3.
However, this speciﬁcation is still unsatisfactory for two main reasons. First, for some
judges we do not observe the initial condition Ai,0 and thus even if judges were working
on a stable rotation we could not estimate the consequences of a higher degree of parallel
working inasmuch as this is determined by the initial condition Ai,0. Second, and perhaps
more importantly, we know from Section 4.4 that judges do not operate according to a stable
rotation and the number of active cases is not constant over time at the initial value Ai,0.
Outside of a stable rotation, Proposition 3 holds and therefore the correct speciﬁcation must
include a variable Pi,q that measures how the degree of parallelism changes with respect to
the initial condition. We measure the degree of parallelism in two alternative but related
ways: with the variable νi,q which measures the number of new opened cases by judge i in
quarter q and with the variable Ai,q which measures the number of active cases on the table
of judge i at the end quarter q.
As a result of these considerations the correct speciﬁcation that we want to estimate is





+ β3Pi,q + β4q + δi + ￿i,q (5)
where δi is a judge speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect that absorbs the initial condition Ai,0, even if it is not
observed for some judges.
What signs does the theory predict for the coeﬃcients in this relationship? The signs of
β1 and β2 are almost predicted by Proposition (2), but not exactly since Proposition (2) deals





i,q , whereas β1 and β2 measure the eﬀect
of a temporary increase in their respective variables. So, for example, β1 measures the eﬀect
on duration of going from α,α,α,α,... to α,α,2α,α,...To establish the signs of β1, observe
that an increase in αi,q means that more cases are exogenously assigned to judge i in quarter
q. Therefore, when the time comes for the judge to work on these cases, it will necessarily
take longer to complete them whatever the scheduling of tasks chosen by the judge. Most
theories of the duration of trials, would predict, like ours , that β1 > 0. But in the presence
of learning by doing, economies of scale or positive externalities between cases, one could
imagine that a larger workload might reduce the average duration of assigned cases.
Note that if the workload αi,q were exactly equal for all judges within each quarter, the
inclusion of judges’ ﬁxed eﬀects and quarter ﬁxed eﬀects, on which we come back below,
should prevent the identiﬁcation of β1 because of multicollinearity. But as explained in
Section 2, cases are assigned to judges in order of arrival on a daily basis by alphabetical
order, starting with the judge whose letter is extracted in the morning. So, if there are 10
20judges in service and 15 ﬁled cases, ﬁve judges will receive 2 cases and the other ﬁve only 1
and in the following day the assignment procedure restarts from scratch with the extraction
of a new letter. The assignments may therefore diﬀer slightly across judges but in a way
that is uncorrelated with any non-ignorable characteristics of judges. Thus, even controlling
for quarters and judges ﬁxed eﬀects, the data display judge speciﬁc variability over time of
the workload αi,q.






i,q means that the judge holds more hearings in quarter q ( for whatever
cases are open on her desk), or reduces the number of hearings Si,q needed to close the cases
assigned to her. Si,q increases Di,q mechanically, because it means that cases assigned in q
are more complex (or are considered as such by the judge), and so they take more tasks to
adjudicate. Note also that within each quarter, by random assignment, all judges receive
portfolio of cases that should diﬀer just because of random sampling. Therefore, if Si,q >S j,q
it must be either because judge i has randomly received a slightly more complex portfolio, or
because the portfolio is eﬀectively identical but judge j is “more able” in the sense that she
can close the same portfolio of cases with fewer hearings on average than judge i. Moreover,
for the same judge across quarters, it could happen that Si,q >S i,p, with q<p , and this
may happen either because the ability of judge i increases over time or because the assigned
cases becomes less diﬃcult on average over time.
The main focus of our analysis is on the parameter β3 which measures the eﬀect of
parallelism on total duration of all trials assigned in a quarter. Proposition 3 states without
ambiguity that this coeﬃcient should be estimated to be positive independently of whether
the degree of parallelism is measured by Pi,q = νi,q or Pi,q = Ai,q.
Finally, Proposition (2) gives the condition for the coeﬃcient on the time trend β4 to be
positive. We specify this trend in the most ﬂexible way as a set of dummies for each quarter,
so that we can control also for seasonality, and we expect the trend implicitly deﬁned by the
quarter dummies to be positive.
5.2 Identiﬁcation
While αi,q is randomly assigned, if work scheduling has a role in the determination of the






i,q but also with the degree of parallelism Pi,q, however measured. This because
the error term includes lagged and forward values of standardized eﬀort as well as the
unobservable parameter that describes the capacity of judges to resist the lobbying of parties
in trials who want to anticipate the ﬁrst hearing of their case. As discussed in Section 4.5,
21this unobservable parameter ultimately determines the degree of parallelism chosen by a
judge and there is no reason to expect that it should be time invariant, given that it could
change with the diﬃculty of assigned cases or their number.
Therefore to estimate consistently the causal eﬀects of standardized eﬀort and task jug-
gling on trials duration with equation 5, we need some exogenous source of variation of these
two variables. As far as standardized eﬀort is concerned, this exogenous source of variation
is oﬀered by the alphabetical system that determines the assignment of cases to judges on
a daily basis. As a result of this system, within a speciﬁc quarter judge i may receive a
slightly larger fraction of urgent or complicated cases than judge j, simply because of the
randomly chosen letter of the alphabet from which the assignment of cases to judges was
started in the days of that speciﬁc quarter. We therefore use as instrument for standardized
eﬀort the fraction of “urgent” cases and the fraction of “diﬃcult” cases that judges receive
in each quarter.9
Note that these instruments, which capture the complexity or urgency of assigned contro-
versies conditionally on the size of the workload, aﬀect the duration of cases mainly through
the eﬀort e or the ability/ perceived diﬃculty of cases S. For example, if judge i receives
randomly more diﬃcult cases than judge j in a given quarter, this event can aﬀect dura-
tion only if the judge changes the number of hearings per quarter (ei,q) or if he changes the
number of hearings needed to adjudicate the cases assigned in the quarter (Si,q).
An instrument for the degree of parallelism Pi,q, whether measured with the number of
new opened cases νi,q or with the number of active cases Ai,q, can instead be constructed
exploiting a procedural prescription that constraints the freedom of judges to decide when to
hold the ﬁrst hearing of non urgent cases. Judges are in fact invited to hold the ﬁrst hearing
of these cases within 60 days from ﬁling. There is no penalty for a delay but if long delays
become systematic the judge may be put under disciplinary investigation by the Consiglio
Superiore della Magistratura, i.e., the independent body that governs judges. As a result
of this prescription, if the number of non-urgent cases assigned to judge i increases in the
current quarter, the number of cases reaching the “60 days” threshold in the next quarter will
be higher, putting some pressure on judge i to open more new cases. Descriptive evidence
concerning the pressure generated by the “60 days” rule on judges is oﬀered in Figure 6,
which plots the distribution of inactive duration, i.e. the number of days between assignment
9The classiﬁcation of a case as “diﬃcult” was implemented using an independent survey of judges which
were asked to classify the typology of possible cases according to their complication. “Urgent” cases are
instead those cases that by law have to be completed in one hearing to be held almost immediately after
ﬁling, for example because some crucial worker’s right is under prejudice and immediate protection is needed.
These cases typically anticipate the related underlying trial that follows later as a separate case.
22and the ﬁrst hearing of non-urgent cases. The ﬁgure suggests that judges rarely touch cases
before they are“late”, i.e. before 60 days from assignment. This is presumably because they
are busy opening other, more ancient cases. After a case is already late, then a judge feels
the pressure to try to open it soon in order to minimize the days of violation of the “60
days” rule. This behavior would be consistent with the notion that it is the most egregious
violations of the “60 days” rule that might get the judge in trouble. In other words, the “60
days” rule works essentially like a bell that rings reminding judges that they should start
acting on cases. Penalties for trespassing hit only if judges wait “too long” to react after the
bell.
We therefore construct an instrument Zi,q for the degree of parallelism Pi,q, deﬁned as
the ratio of the number of cases assigned to judge i in the previous quarter divided by the





This instrument captures the idea that judges who feel the pressure of the “60 days” rule will
open more new cases and this is expected to increase the duration of all their assigned cases.
However, as any assignment-to-treatment mechanism, also this one suﬀers the possibility of
non-compliance. Not all judges feel the pressure of the “60 days” rule, but some do feel
it, as suggested by Figure 6 and by the ﬁrst stage statistics discussed in the next section
5.3, and tend to open more or less new cases depending on which fraction of trials, within
the recently assigned load, gets near or has just passed the “60 days” threshold. Note that
the instrument is randomly assigned because it depends only on the assignments of new
cases to judges in the current and previous quarters, which results from the propensity to
litigate of workers and ﬁrms in Milan and from the alphabetical daily assignment system.
The instrument displays judge speciﬁc variability over time and is therefore compatible with
the inclusion of judges and quarters ﬁxed eﬀects.10
Anecdotal evidence on the relevance of this instrument is oﬀered by the fact when the
results of this research were made public in Italy, some judges who were put under investiga-
tion because too many of their ﬁrst hearings took place far beyond the “60 days” threshold,
informed us by email that they defended themselves showing that, by working sequentially,
they had lower average durations than their colleagues. And were indeed acquitted on the
basis of this evidence, which is completely in line with the prediction of our theory.
10Note also that αi,q−1 would be an alternative simpler instrument and it would be randomly assigned as
well. However it would violate the exclusion restriction because a higher workload in the previous quarter
delays completion of cases assigned in the current quarter not only via the eﬀect on parallelism, but also
directly because judges have more cases to complete before starting to work on those assigned in the current
quarter. Non-reported evidence based αi,q−1 as an instrument conﬁrms this intuition.
235.3 Estimates
Table 3 gives the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the econometric analysis,
while results of the estimation of equation 5 are presented in Table 4. In the ﬁrst column
the degree of parallelism Pi,q is measured with the number of new opened cases per quarter
νi,q, i.e., the number of assigned cases for which the judge holds the ﬁrst hearing in the
current quarter. All estimates are statistically signiﬁcant and the signs correspond to the
prediction of the theory. In particular, more task juggling measured by a larger number
of new opened trials increases the average duration of all cases assigned during the current
quarter. Similarly positive is the eﬀect of a larger assigned workload in the quarter, while a
greater standardized eﬀort reduces duration and the implicit time trend is positive.
These estimates, however, are potentially inconsistent for the causal eﬀect of interest.
Column 2 reports Instrumental Variable (IV) estimates obtained using the instruments de-






larger and still statistically signiﬁcant. At the mean of the distribution of new opened cases
(127)11, ten fewer newly opened cases in a quarter (an 8% decrease of this indicator of task
juggling) reduce the duration of assigned cases by 8.6 days (a 3% improvement, given a mean
duration of 290 days). To put the size of this eﬀect in the right perspective we can ask how
many new hearings per quarter (for given diﬃculty of cases) the representative judge would
have to hold in order to achieve the same reduction in the total duration of assigned trials.





i,q, 4.7 additional units of standardized
eﬀort per quarter (a 4% increase at the mean of this variable which is 128) would be needed
to reduce the duration of assigned cases by the same amount of 8.6 days. In other words,
at the mean, an 8% decrease of task juggling has the same eﬀect as a 4% increase of eﬀort.
If the average number of hearings per case is S =3 .2, 4.7 units of standardized eﬀort mean
approximately 15 more hearings per quarters.
In the third column of Table 4 we report estimates that measure the degree of task
juggling as the number of active cases Ai,q on the desk of each judge at the end of a quarter.
Also in this column all the estimates are statistically signiﬁcant at standard levels and the
signs correspond to the predictions of the theory. Using the corresponding IV estimates of
the fourth column to compare the size of the eﬀects, ten fewer active cases in a quarter
(approximately a 5% decrease of this indicator of task juggling, at the mean of 210 active
cases per quarter) reduce the duration of assigned cases by 6.2 days (a 2% improvement). To
achieve the same eﬀect with more standardized eﬀort per quarter the representative judge
11See the descriptive statistics in Table 3
24would have to increase it by 5.3 units. So, in this case, a 5% decrease of task juggling has
the same eﬀect as a 4% increase in standardized eﬀort. If the average number of hearings
per case is S =3 .2, 5.3 units of standardized eﬀort mean approximately 17 more hearings
per quarters.
Table 5 reports results from ﬁrst stage estimations, which show that the instruments are
suﬃciently strong not to jeopardize our interpretation of the IV estimates of equation 5.I n
columns 2 and 3 of this Table we report Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics. These test statistics
are above the critical values computed in Stock and Yogo (2005), Table 5.2, that imply an IV
bias equal to at most 10% of the OLS bias for the speciﬁcation in which Pi,q = νi,q (critical
value: 13.43) and to at most 15 % for the speciﬁcation in which Pi,q = Ai,q (critical value:
8.18). Note also that the three instruments have diﬀerent eﬀects on the two endogenous
variables. As expected (see Section 5.2), in the ﬁrst stage regression for standardized eﬀort,
e
S, the fraction of new urgent cases and the fraction of new diﬃcult cases per quarter are
estimated to have eﬀects that are signiﬁcant and with the expected sign, while the fraction
of recently assigned cases beyond the “60 days” threshold is not statistically signiﬁcant. In
the ﬁrst stage regressions of the measures of parallelism ν and A, instead, the “60 days” rule
originates the most powerful instrument.
Thus, the evidence based on the judges considered by this study conﬁrms the prediction
of our theory. Judges who are induced to juggle more tasks, i.e. to work according to a more
parallel schedule because of the “60 days” rule, require more time to complete the cases
assigned to them. The estimated causal eﬀect is not only statistically signiﬁcant but also
quantitatively important in comparison to the causal eﬀect of exerting more standardized
eﬀort in terms of more hearings per quarters or fewer hearings to close a case.
5.4 Extensions and robustness checks
We conclude our empirical analysis summarizing the results of three extensions and robust-
ness checks that enhance our understanding of the eﬀects of task juggling on the performance
of judges.12
First it could be argued that from a normative point of view we should be interested in the
overall eﬀect of an exogenous increase of task juggling on total duration without controlling
for standardized eﬀort, which is in itself an endogenous variable. Suppose that a sudden
increase of new assigned cases 60 days ago induces today an increase of parallel working
because of the “60 days” rule. Total duration of job completion will be aﬀected directly for
12To save on space, we do not report the full set of tables concerning these results (avalable from authors)
but only the main estimates of interest.
25given eﬀort, because this eﬀort must be spread on a larger number of active cases and in
particular must be taken away from those jobs that are closer to completion. But there is
also an indirect eﬀect via the change in the eﬀort exerted by the judge. On the one end, the
return to eﬀort in terms of reduction of total duration is lower because eﬀort is more thinly
spread across tasks. On the other hand, if the judge wants to minimize total duration, she
may want to compensate with more eﬀort the undesirable eﬀect of the exogenously induced
increase in task juggling.
The overall direct and indirect eﬀect of increased task juggling is captured by the coeﬃ-
cient ˜ β3 in this equation,
Di,q = ˜ β0 + ˜ β1αi,q + ˜ β3Pi,q + ˜ β4q + ˜ δi +˜ ￿i,q, (7)
that is like speciﬁcation 5 without the inclusion of standardized eﬀort. From an econometric
viewpoint, an advantage of this speciﬁcation is that it includes only one endogenous variable.
The IV estimates of ˜ β3 are positive and equal to 0.52 when Pi,q = νi,q (against 0.86 for β3 in
equation 5) and 0.47 when Pi,q = Ai,q (against 0.62 for β3 in equation 5) but not precisely
estimated (standard errors are equal to 0.32 and 0.34 respectively). Thus the overall eﬀect of
task juggling is lower than the direct eﬀect controlling for standardized eﬀort. This suggests
that judges tend to compensate with higher eﬀort the eﬀects of an exogenous increase of
task juggling.
A second exercise concerns the eﬀect of task juggling on the duration of the longest case
assigned to a judge within a short period. Consider the simple “two-jobs” example described
in the Introduction of this paper. If the judge works in a parallel fashion, both jobs need
(approximately) twenty days to be completed. If the judge works sequentially, the ﬁrst job
is completed in ten days after assignment, but the second is completed after twenty days.
Hence in both cases the longest job is completed in (approximately) twenty days. If real
data corresponded to this simple example we should ﬁnd that measures of parallelism do
not aﬀect the duration of the longest job among those assigned in a given quarter. There
are, however, at least three kinds of reasons that might generate a diﬀerent result. First,
judges do not receive cases in one period only, but keep receiving new cases period after
period. Consider the duration of the longest case assigned in period 1. This duration is
unaﬀected by the degree of task juggling among the cases assigned in period 1. But if the
judge continues to open cases also in period 2, taking away eﬀort from those already opened
in period 1, the duration of the longest case assigned in period 1 will increase with respect to
the situation of purely sequential working. Second, if there are costs of switching attention
from one case to another, a judge spreading eﬀort on many active cases will incur in larger
26switching costs. Thus, in the presence of such costs, an exogenous increase of parallelism
should increase the duration of the longest job assigned in a given period. On the contrary, if
working sequentially is more “boring”, a decrease of parallelism should increase the duration
of the longest job assigned in a given period, because the judge is annoyed by working on
only few cases at the same time and takes longer than strictly necessary to complete each of
them.
To explore these possibilities we estimate the following variation of equation 5:





+ λ3Pi,q + λ4q + δi +Λ i,q (8)
in which we proxy the duration of the longest case assigned to judge i in quarter q with the
average duration of the cases in the highest decile of the distribution of durations for quarter
q, and we denote this quantity as Li,q.13 The IV estimate of the eﬀect of parallelism λ3 is
equal to 2.62 (s.e: 1.17) when Pi,q = νi,q and to 1.79 (s.e.: 1.09) when Pi,q = Ai,q . Thus,
it seems that the eﬀect boredness is dominated by the eﬀects of switching costs and of the
continuous ﬂow of new cases.
Finally, an implication of our theory is that an exogenous increase of task juggling should
induce an anticipation of the opening of new cases and thus should reduce the average time
between assignment and the ﬁrst hearing, i.e. the inactive duration. Consider again the
simple “two-jobs” example described in the Introduction. If the judge works sequentially
the average inactive duration is equal to
0+10
2 = 5 days. If she starts working in parallel,
that is on job A on even days and on job B on odd days, the average inactive duration
becomes 0+1
2 =0 .5. To test whether this prediction is veriﬁed in our data we estimate again
a diﬀerent variation of equation 5:





+ µ3Pi,q + µ4q + δi + ηi,q (9)
in which the dependent variable Ii,q is the average fraction of total duration that is inactive
for the cases assigned to judge i in quarter q. The IV estimate of the eﬀect of parallelism µ3
is equal to -0.14 (s.e: 0.04) when Pi,q = νi,q and to -0.10 (s.e.: 0.04) when Pi,q = Ai,q. The
fact that also this prediction is veriﬁed supports the validity and robustness of our theory.
6 Conclusions
We presented theoretical reasons and empirical evidence in favor of the hypothesis that in-
dividual work scheduling has signiﬁcant eﬀects on the speed at which workers can complete
13We obtain similar results using diﬀerent proxies like the eﬀectively longest duration or the duration of
the case corresponding to 90th percentile of the distribution.
27assigned jobs. Speciﬁcally, we claimed that, for given size of assigned workload, workers who
juggle too many tasks are necessarily slower in completing this workload than workers who
concentrate sequentially on few tasks at the same time. Relative to our theoretical compan-
ion paper (Coviello et al. 2010), which contains a fully ﬂedged model of work scheduling
and performance but is restricted to constant growth paths as deﬁned in that paper, the
theoretical contribution in this paper is to show that, ceteris paribus, a non-permanent in-
crease in new cases opened in one period increases the duration of the cases that are yet to
be completed, regardless of whether the worker is in a constant growth path. The intuition
is that by adding one task to those which the worker is already juggling, she pulls resources
away from her other active tasks which are closer to being completed. Moreover, the newly
opened task does not beneﬁt from being opened earlier, in the sense that it will still have to
wait before all other tasks are completed.
We test this prediction on a sample of Italian judges and show that those who are
exogenously induced to juggle more trials take more time to complete similar portfolios of
cases. In order to identify this causal eﬀect of tasks juggling we construct time-varying
instruments based on the sample realization of the lottery that allocates cases to each judge.
This lottery is used in combination with the procedural rule prescribing that judges should
hold the ﬁrst hearing of a case no later than 60 days from ﬁling. In this way exogenous
increases in the number of assigned cases generate pressure for more task juggling around
and after 60 days from ﬁling.
We view the analysis in this paper and its companion (Coviello et al. 2010) as a ﬁrst step
into the theoretical and empirical analysis of work scheduling. Although the intuition for the
ineﬃciency of task juggling is strong, measuring the quantitative eﬀects of task juggling is
far from straightforward. There are several reasons for this. First, since we are dealing with
a dynamic production function, the productivity at each point in time depends on inputs
in past periods, which is a source of complexity. Second, work schedules come in an almost
inﬁnite range of variations, in principle equal to all the ways in which S steps of each of
N tasks can be ordered (a very large cardinality indeed!). Our theoretical approach deals
with this complexity by parameterizing work schedules according to a simple measure: how
many new jobs are opened in each quarter (with few jobs corresponding to little juggling).
Establishing the empirical relevance of this simpliﬁcation is a large part of the methodological
contribution of this paper.
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7.1 Omitted proofs
Lemma 1. In a full rotation, cs is immediately followed by (c +1 ) s and Cs is immediately
followed by 1s+1.
Proof. The ﬁrst element of the order must by deﬁnition be 11. The deﬁnition of full rotation
implies that, between the ﬁrst and second step of the ﬁrst case, 11 and 12, there must be
tasks 21,31,...,C1. By Deﬁnition 1 b, these tasks must be ordered as 21 ≺ 31 ≺ ... ≺ C1.
This shows that c1 is immediately followed by (c +1 ) 1 . Now, we claim that only these tasks
can lie between 11 and 12. Suppose by contradiction that there was some c2 in between 11
and 12. Then we would have 11 ≺ c1 ≺ c2 ≺ 12, which violates the deﬁnition of full rotation
(set c0 =1 ) . Next, let us show that C1 is immediately followed by 12. Again, suppose not:
then it would be immediately followed by some c2 6=1 2. In this case we have a contradiction
of Deﬁnition 1 b (set c0 =1 ) . Reasoning by induction establishes the full statement of the
Lemma.
The following Lemma will be used in the proof of Proposition 1.
Lemma 2. In a rotation on the open, if cs ≺ c0
1 ≺ cs+1 then ck+s ≺ c0
k+1 ≺ ck+s+1 ≺ c0
k+2
for k =0 ,...,S − (s +1 ).
Proof. Let b k denote the lowest k at which there is a violation of the statement of the lemma.
First, let us rule out b k =0 . If b k = 0 the only work schedule that violates the statement takes
the form cs ≺ c0
1 ≺ c0
2 ≺ cs+1. But this contradicts the deﬁnition of rotation on the open
(just switch c and c0). Therefore it must be cs ≺ c0
1 ≺ cs+1 ≺ c0
2. Suppose then that b k =1 .
This means that cs+1 ≺ c0
2 ≺ cs+2 ≺ c0
3 is violated. There are only two work schedules which
violate this. One is cs+1 ≺ c0
2 ≺ c0
3 ≺ cs+2, and this is not a rotation on the open (just switch
c and c0 in Deﬁnition 2). The other is cs+1 ≺ cs+2 ≺ c0
2 ≺ c0
3, which violates Deﬁnition 2
(case c0 is open while the judge executes steps cs+1 and cs+2). Since both violations are not
compatible with the deﬁnition of rotation on the open, it cannot be that b k =1 . Reasoning
by induction proves the lemma.
This property says that, as soon as a case c0 is started, its steps are accomplished in
lockstep with the steps of all other cases already open, in the sense that the schedule will
rotate among the steps of these cases in the same order. This does not mean, of course,
that the interval between two tasks ck+s and c0
k is always the same as k progresses That will
depend on how many other cases are being opened and closed as the schedule unfolds.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. First, observe that all cases c<b c will obviously last weakly longer, and be disposed
no earlier, after the anticipation. Let us turn to the time at which cases b c,b c +1 ,... are
disposed.
29Consider now two cases c,c0 with b c<c<c 0. The relative order in which tasks from c and
c0 are performed is fully determined once we know the index s that solves cs ≺ c0
1 ≺ cs+1.
That is because, by Lemma 2, once two cases have been started they go in lockstep forever
after, meaning that the relative ordering of their tasks does not change even though the
time that elapses between them changes as other cases are opened and closed. Now, if
ρ(c0
1) − ρ(c1)=k (which means that under the old schedule c0 was opened k periods after
c was opened) under the new schedule we still must have e ρ(c0
1) − e ρ(c1)=k. However, if
there was some cs being accomplished before c0
1, that is ρ(cs) <ρ(c0
1), it is not guaranteed
that e ρ(cs) < e ρ(c0
1). This is because there may be open cases at the time that c is started
whose steps must be accomplished before c2 is performed, and that may well push c2 (or
more generally cs) until after c0
1. This means that e ρ(cs) > e ρ(c0
1)i fρ(cs) >ρ (c0
1), but the
converse is not necessarily true. Now, once case c0 >chas been started, then c and c0
are accomplished in lockstep forever after, meaning that the relative ordering of their tasks
does not change even though the time that elapses between them changes as other cases are
opened and closed. Therefore, by the time cS is done, there are fewer steps of case c0 left to
accomplish relative to the initial schedule.
Now, set c = C − 1 and c0 = C. There can be no tasks of cases of index smaller than c
between cS and c0
S because cases opened earlier are ﬁnished before cases opened later. Only
steps of case c0 can be left to accomplish. Then our result implies that e ρ(CS)−e ρ((C − 1)S) ≤
ρ(CS) − ρ((C − 1)S). Since e ρ(CS)=ρ(CS), it follows that e ρ((C − 1)S) ≥ ρ((C − 1)S),
that is, case C − 1 is accomplished later due to the anticipation.
Now set c = C − 2. Setting c0 = C implies that there are fewer steps of case C to
accomplish between (C − 2)S and CS. Setting c0 = C−1 implies that there are fewer steps of
case C−1 to accomplish between (C − 2)S and (C − 1)S . Since only steps of cases C and C−1
can arise between (C − 2)S and CS, we have shown that there are fewer steps of any case that
are performed between (C − 2)S and CS. Thus, e ρ(CS)−e ρ((C − 2)S) ≤ ρ(CS)−ρ((C − 2)S).
Since e ρ(CS)=ρ(CS), it follows that e ρ((C − 2)S) ≥ ρ((C − 2)S), that is, case C − 2i s
accomplished later due to the anticipation.
Reasoning analogously, one can show that any case c0 > b c is disposed no earlier due to
the anticipation.
7.2 Derivation of an equation for the duration of trials in a Stable
Rotation
Let us start with some notation. For each quarter q, denote by α the number of cases
assigned to the judge in that quarter, let ν denote the rate at which cases are opened in that
quarter, let e denote the eﬀort (number of tasks accomplished) in that quarter. Finally, let A
denote the number of cases actively being worked on in a quarter. None of these quantities
is indexed by q because in steady state they will all be constant over time.14
14In steady state the judge works on A active cases in all quarters, including q =0 . One way to think
about the presence of A at the beginning of a judge’s tenure is that every incoming judge inherits the case
30Our task is to determine the ν that is compatible with the stable rotation, given the
judge’s eﬀort e and the number of tasks S required to dispose a case. As there are A active
cases at the beginning of a quarter, and since every time a case closes another one opens, at
any instant within a quarter there are exactly A open cases. If we link any case that closes
to the one that opens right after it closes, we have exactly A “links” in each quarter. Due
to the procedure of rotation on the open, the judge must accomplish an equal number of
tasks for each link. Since by assumption e tasks are accomplished in total in each quarter, it
follows that exactly
e
A steps must accomplished for each link. This implies that, at the end
of the quarter, those cases are completed which, at the beginning of the quarter, had less
than e
A steps remaining. How many are those cases? To ﬁnd out, observe that since we are
positing the same rate ν of input and output in every quarter, at any point in time there
must be an equal number of cases which are x steps away from completion, regardless of x.
For example, at the beginning of a quarter there are exactly as many cases needing 1 step to
dispose (i.e., are almost done) as there are needing S steps (i.e., are just beginning). Given
this observation, we can compute how many cases have less than e
A steps remaining at the





/S of the total number A of cases open at
the beginning of the quarter. Therefore, in steady state the number of cases adjudicated in








In other words, a steady state requires that cases be opened at the rate of
e
S per quarter. If
cases are opened at this rate, then exactly e
S cases are adjudicated in each quarter.15
Now let us work out the duration of a case. In a steady state cases are completed at the
rate of ν per quarter. Then, given that α cases are assigned per quarter, a case assigned in
quarter q ﬁnds
A0 + αq − vq
unﬁnished cases in front of it.16 The duration Dq of a case is essentially the time it takes to
adjudicate the unﬁnished cases that precede it. Given a completion rate ν, this duration is
Dq =
A0 + αq − νq
ν
.
Plugging ν = e/S this into this equation yields equation (2).
load of the outgoing judge which he replaces.
15If more than e/S cases are opened in a quarter then the rate at which cases are adjudicated falls below
e/S. We will show this in the next section.
16The presence of the term A0 reﬂects the fact that we are assuming that in every period starting from
q =0 , there are A cases actively being worked on.
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33Table 1: Variability of assignments per quarter across judges
Quarter of observation New cases per judge Number
Average St. Dev. of judges
2000q1 129 13 18
2000q2 112 11 18
2000q3 82 7 17
2000q4 120 22 17
2001q1 137 20 17
2001q2 134 11 17
2001q3 120 14 17
2001q4 123 21 18
2002q1 134 30 18
2002q2 149 19 16
2002q3 100 11 16
2002q4 144 17 16
2003q1 147 19 16
2003q2 139 21 16
2003q3 108 12 15
2003q4 131 29 16
2004q1 139 17 15
2004q2 151 23 16
2004q3 108 23 17
2004q4 114 31 17
2005q1 123 28 13
2005q2 155 43 13
2005q3 132 18 11
2005q4 161 33 11
Average 128 28 17
34Table 2: The panel structure
Judge identiﬁer Number of quarters of service per year Total number of Average number of
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 quarters of service new cases per quarter
1 4 4 4 4 4 0 20 107
3 4 4 1 0 0 0 9 105
5 4 4 4 4 4 4 24 143
6 4 4 4 4 4 0 20 129
7 4 4 4 4 4 2 22 118
8 4 1 4 4 4 0 17 119
9 4 4 1 0 0 0 9 110
10 4 4 4 2 0 0 14 118
11 4 4 4 4 4 4 24 141
12 4 4 4 2 4 4 22 138
13 4 4 4 4 4 2 22 120
14 4 4 4 2 0 0 14 125
15 4 4 4 4 4 0 20 127
18 0 0 0 0 4 4 8 152
19 2 4 4 4 2 4 20 122
20 4 4 4 4 4 4 24 137
21 4 4 4 4 4 4 24 120
22 4 4 4 4 4 4 24 138
24 4 4 4 4 4 4 24 135
29 0 0 0 2 4 4 10 150
30 0 0 0 3 4 4 11 121
Total (average in last col) 70 69 66 63 65 48 381 128
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7Figure 3: Work ﬂow in a stable rotation
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9Figure 5: Deviation from a stable rotation
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1Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Mean sd p25 p50 p75 n
Outcomes:
Total duration 290 77 229 285 352 381
Total duration of the cases in the highest decile 766 217 618 753 906 381
Inactive duration 127 36 98 122 150 381
Fraction of total duration that is inactive 45 10 38 43 50 381
Closed cases per quarter 119 35 98 122 145 381
Task juggling:
Active cases at the end of quarter 210 74 154 206 266 381
New opened cases per quarter 127 46 93 137 159 381
Workload, eﬀort, and ability:
New assigned cases per quarter 128 28 111 132 146 381
Hearings per quarter 396 125 306 425 490 381
Hearings per case 3.2 .57 2.9 3.3 3.6 381
Standardized eﬀort per quarter 128 45 98 131 156 381
Composition of the workload:
Fraction of new urgent cases assigned per quarter 16 8.1 9 17 22 381
Fraction of new diﬃcult cases assigned per quarter 12 7.1 5.7 12 19 381
Fraction of cases beyond the “60 days limit” 51 6.5 47 51 55 381
Note: All variables are deﬁned per quarter. Standardized eﬀort is deﬁned as the ratio between the Hearings per quarter and the Hearings per case and can be interpreted as the
potential number of trials that a judge could complete in a quarter given her average number of hearings per case.
4
2Table 4: The eﬀect of parallel working on duration out of a stable rotation
Estimation Method OLS IV OLS IV
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
νi,q: New opened cases per quarter 0.39 0.86
(0.08) (0.37)
Ai,q: Active cases at the end of quarter 0.29 0.62
(0.07) (0.30)
αi,q: New assigned cases per quarter 0.31 0.05 0.35 0.18
(0.09) (0.19) (0.09) (0.15)
e
S i,q: Standardized eﬀort per quarter -0.84 -1.81 -0.67 -1.18
(0.09) (0.42) (0.08) (0.30)
Implicit trend 4.25 6.67 1.95 1.04
( 0.60) ( 1.12) (0.58 ) (1.23)
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic (Joint) 15.19 8.88
Sargan test (p-value) 0.93 0.28
Judges ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarters ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 381 381 381 381
Number of Judges 21 21 21 21
R2 0.54 0.34 0.55 0.43
R2 including judges’ ﬁxed eﬀects 0.85 0.79 0.85 0.81
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standardized eﬀort is deﬁned as the ratio between the Hearings per quarter and
the Hearings per case and can be interpreted as the potential number of trials that a judge could complete in a quarter given
his average number of hearings per case. The “Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic (Joint)” denotes the minimum eigenvalue of the
joint ﬁrst-stage F-statistic matrix. When denoted with “Yes”, regressions include Judges Fixed Eﬀects (21 dummies); Quarter
dummies (2000q1-2005q4).




Variables (1) (2) (3)
Fraction of new urgent cases assigned per quarter 2.10 1.02 -0.92
(0.48) (0.31) (0.65)
Fraction of new diﬃcult cases assigned per quarter -0.94 -0.06 -0.18
(0.56) (0.40) (0.61)
Fraction of cases beyond the “60 days limit” 0.37 2.29 2.50
(0.65) (0.57) (0.98)
New assigned cases per quarter 0.02 0.70 0.71
(0.15) (0.09) (0.24)
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic (Joint) 15.19 8.88
Judges ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Quarters ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 381 381 381
Number of Judges 21 21 21
R2 0.77 0.79 0.72
R2 including judges’ ﬁxed eﬀects 0.76 0.79 0.84
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standardized eﬀort is deﬁned as the ratio between the “hearings per quarter”
and the “hearings per case” and can be interpreted as the potential number of trials that a judge could complete in a quarter,
given his average number of hearings per case. The “Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic (Joint)” denotes the minimum eigenvalue
of the joint ﬁrst-stage F-statistic matrix. The F statistic reported in column 2 is for e
S and A, while the one reported in column
3 is for e
S and ν. When denoted with “Yes”, regressions include Judges ﬁxed eﬀects (21 dummies) and Quarter dummies
(2000q1-2005q4).
44